Tracing the historical backdrops of the two nations, spanning from the 19th century, Italy’s expansion in the Red Sea, the subsequent colonial-era partitions and contested issues to federation, armed struggle, and eventually separation, Endrias still questions whether these two nations will continue to pursue their independent paths or “venture to grip on working on their common destiny of interdependence—a long-stayed reality.”

The article recalls what it describes as “lost opportunities,” among which was the 1952 federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, brokered under a UN resolution. It notes that this arrangement was short-lived, as the Ethiopian imperial government gradually eroded the federal structure until, as the author writes, “the final blow came in 1962 when Emperor Haile Selassie dissolved the federation and annexed Eritrea as a province.”

Another missed opportunity, the article states, was the ascent of the Derg in 1974, which had initially raised hopes for reconciliation with Eritrean armed resistance groups backed by Sudan, Egypt, and Arab states. However, the Derg responded with fierce military offensives, leading to “a more formidable resistance than peaceful resolution,” and eventually to Eritrea’s independence in 1993—an independence that many Eritreans “venerated as the seal of a long and bitter struggle,” while many Ethiopians experienced it with “pain, confusion, and resentment.”

Another opportunity, as implicitly stated in the article, was the post-1993 period when the allied forces of the TPLF and EPLF, who together toppled the Derg Regime, allowed Ethiopia to continue accessing Eritrea’s ports of Assab and Massawa. In return, Eritrea was allowed to use the Ethiopian birr—a symbol of mutual cooperation. This opportunity, however, was “short-lived too,” when Eritrea introduced its own currency, the Nakfa. Coupled with unresolved territorial issues and economic disagreements, the two nations went to the bloody 1998–2000 war, which “led to thousands of lives lost and a diplomatic stalemate for over two decades,” forcing Ethiopia to rely on Djibouti for port access.

According to the author, the two-decade-old diplomatic stalemate appeared to reignite rapprochement with the coming of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his communication with President Isaias Afwerki. However, this “couldn’t be materialized into formal bilateral agreements,” as Abiy pursued an ambitious, rapid political and economic integration agenda, while President Isaias remained wary of Eritrea’s smaller economy and protective of its sovereignty. The two-year Tigray war (2020–2022) and the subsequent Pretoria Agreement, the article says, “further refueled the complexity of bringing lasting peace between the two countries.”

The article argues that “addressing the complexities in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations is essential” for advancing a more peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship between the two nations. In geopolitical terms, it explains that the Horn of Africa—where both nations are located—is “the most contested and strategically vital region,” where superpowers and mid-level powers, including Gulf states, compete for control of the Red Sea, “adversely affecting both Ethiopia and Eritrea.” It asserts that “the regional environment in the Horn of Africa continues to shape and constrain the trajectory of Ethiopia–Eritrea relations.”

Furthermore, the article argues that sustaining peace between the two nations hinges critically on political stability, mutual trust, and progressive governance reform in both countries. Despite some divergence, Endrias emphasizes that Ethiopia and Eritrea “have shared deep historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic ties that span centuries.” He further notes that their relationship has profound implications for the broader region, particularly in “security cooperation, economic integration, and political stability.” Genuine reconciliation, he asserts, requires “political reform that includes more inclusive governance, respect for the rule of law, and institutional cooperation.”

The article underlines that one of the most tangible opportunities for Ethiopia and Eritrea lies in economic integration, especially in the areas of infrastructure and port access. It argues that Eritrea’s Red Sea ports—Assab and Massawa—“have strategic significance for Ethiopia’s landlocked economy.” Access to these ports could reduce Ethiopia’s overdependence on Djibouti, lower transportation costs, and enhance regional trade competitiveness. For Eritrea, renewed port activity would “attract investment, generate employment, and provide access to Ethiopia’s large consumer market,” fostering mutually beneficial economic interdependence.

However, the lingering political mistrust, security concerns, and the absence of formal agreements on customs, transit, and corridor management remain hurdles to realizing this cooperation. The article stresses that “establishing structured, legally binding accords on port access, transport infrastructure, and cross-border services is vital” for transforming symbolic cooperation into sustainable economic partnership. Deeper integration could also be facilitated through “cross-border rail infrastructure and telecommunications linkages.” Peaceful, well-managed borders could enable “the free movement of goods, labor, and services,” stimulating trade, tourism, and investment.

Being located in one of the most geopolitically strategic areas, the Horn of Africa, both Ethiopia and Eritrea—if allied—could play significant roles. In theory, the article notes, “a coordinated Ethiopian–Eritrean approach to regional engagement, particularly within multilateral platforms like IGAD and the AU, could enhance their collective voice and influence.” In practice, however, “long-standing mistrust, diverging foreign policy priorities, and competing national interests” often undermine the prospects for such collaboration.

The deterioration of relations between the two countries has not only disrupted bilateral progress but also led to “missed opportunities for advancing peace and stability across the Horn.” Their strained dynamic, at times, has “fueled rivalries and proxy politics,” particularly in conflict-prone areas like Tigray, Somalia, and eastern Sudan. Nevertheless, improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the article contends, “could have transformative effects for the region.” Cooperation between the two would strengthen regional counterterrorism operations, disrupt extremist networks, and help de-escalate border disputes. “A stable Ethiopia–Eritrea coexistence,” it argues, could serve as “a linchpin for broader Horn of Africa peace-building efforts,” offering a model for post-conflict reconciliation and regional integration.

The article underscores that Eritrea’s concerns about Ethiopia’s Red Sea aspirations “should not automatically translate into opposition to Ethiopia’s right to seek peaceful access through diplomatic means with neighboring coastal states.” Conversely, Ethiopia must ensure that its aspirations are “communicated as part of a cooperative regional vision,” rather than one that revives old tensions or fosters perceptions of coercion.

The path toward a more stable and mutually respectful Ethiopia–Eritrea relationship, Endrias stresses, “depends on both countries embracing the principle of sovereign equality and committing to non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs.” Introducing elements of leverage or pursuing influence through proxy alignments, he warns, “will only perpetuate cycles of mistrust and hostility.” If both nations can move beyond historical grievances and “reframe their strategic priorities in a spirit of dialogue, transparency, and mutual respect,” the Horn of Africa could “benefit from a new era of cooperation.” Such a transformation, the article concludes, “would not only serve the long-term interests of both states but would also reflect the deep ties and shared futures of their peoples.”

A forward-looking relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Endrias maintains, “requires a fundamental shift in perspective—one that emphasizes their shared strengths rather than entrenched differences.” For the two nations to break from “the cycle of historical grievance, mutual suspicion, and reactive hostility,” they must acknowledge their interdependence—accepting that “peace in one country contributes to stability in the other,” and that interference, “even when dressed as security concerns, only prolongs insecurity on both sides of the border.”

“What is needed,” the article concludes, “is the establishment of a new framework for engagement—one that includes institutionalized dialogue, joint security mechanisms, and economic interdependence grounded in mutual respect.” Adopting a rules-based approach to bilateral relations, possibly “with the facilitation of neutral third-party mediators or regional institutions,” would benefit both countries.

The decades-long pattern of forging alliances against each other’s interests, including “support for opposition groups and military posturing,” must be decisively abandoned. Eritrea, the author writes, “stands to gain enhanced regional influence, stronger security partnerships, and the reconnection of its people with a deeply familiar society.” Ethiopia, for its part, “must continue to explore multiple avenues for sea access but should prioritize dialogue with Eritrea as the most sustainable and mutually advantageous path.” If Assab emerges as the most feasible outlet, both sides “should negotiate a long-term arrangement based on mutual interests and respect for sovereignty.” Confidence-building measures—such as “formal diplomatic missions, joint border commissions, and multilateral guarantees through the AU or IGAD”—could help institutionalize this new chapter in relations.

By Endrias Amanuel, a researcher, the article entitled ‘Ethiopia and Eritrea – Shared Still a Dream,’ originally published by the Center for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC) – Ethiopia.

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