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Source:The Pan African Review
War may not have been officially declared between the two countries, but war rhetoric is already a reality
The Horn of Africa is once again on the edge, as is often the case whenever tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia rise. In such a context, it is important to assess how Eritrea’s threat-sensitive posture, Ethiopia’s ambitions for sea access, shifting alliances within Tigray, and proxy alignments in Afar and Amhara shape the likelihood of interstate confrontation.
Timing, triggers, and a history of bad blood
Before delving into recent and current dynamics, it is important to keep a few facts in mind.
First, many observers in Ethiopia argue that any significant escalation between the two countries is unlikely before the GERD inauguration—an event the Prime Minister reportedly seeks to internationalise in order to deter potential future attacks on the dam—and note that operational tempo in Afar often follows seasonal conditions, with cooler weather beginning in October.
Second, Eritrea is a small country with limited human resources, and is constantly concerned about external threats to its hard-won independence and territorial integrity. As such, it has no interest in a direct confrontation with a larger and more populous neighbour that risks uniting forces inside Ethiopia that would otherwise remain divided. A proxy warfare is often its preferred strategy—a domain in which it possesses unmatched expertise.
Third, hostility towards Eritrea within Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party is at its peak. In its Central Committee statement of 8 August, the party framed Ethiopia’s current security threats as part of a broader struggle against “historical enemies” and their “proxies,” asserting that these enemies regard Ethiopia’s progress as intolerable and are making a “final attempt” to derail its trajectory. By blending historical grievance with the rhetoric of a last stand, the communiqué seeks both to strengthen fragile internal cohesion and to legitimise firm action against domestic opposition and perceived foreign interference.
Finally, there is a long history of proxy warfare between the two countries. Following the 1998–2000 Eritrean–Ethiopian border war, tensions persisted between the EPLF-led Eritrean government and the TPLF-controlled, EPRDF-led Ethiopian state. Both countries hosted and armed opposition groups against one another. However, the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012 shifted Ethiopia’s focus to internal transition, sidelining Eritrean groups within the country.
Eritrea–Ethiopia dynamics in the Abiy Era (2018–2025)
By the time Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018, many Eritrean opposition groups had grown disillusioned with TPLF policy towards them. Following the 2018 rapprochement between the two countries, most of those with offices in Addis Ababa and armed wings in Tigray left Ethiopia.
During the 2020–2022 Tigray war, Ethiopian and Eritrean forces—alongside elements of the Amhara Fano—fought the TPLF/TDF; Eritrean opposition figures who had been based in Tigray were detained, and many, including those living there as refugees, were forcibly returned to Eritrea, effectively ending their presence in Ethiopia.
However, the Abiy–Isaias alignment soon frayed. Tensions surfaced in 2021, intensified after the 2 November 2022 Pretoria Agreement between the federal government and the TPLF, and have escalated since.
Abiy’s renewed push for Red Sea access since October 2023 has further complicated relations. His claim that Ethiopia erred in relinquishing access to Eritrean ports is contested by those who point out that Eritrea’s independence followed a 30-year war which toppled the regimes of Haile Selassie and Mengistu. This is a veiled warning that any military venture could precipitate the collapse of Ethiopia’s government.
In short, war may not have been officially declared between the two countries, but war rhetoric is already a reality.
The Tigrayan dimension
The 2022 Pretoria Agreement prompted extensive introspection within Tigray and across its diaspora—on strategic failures, accountability, and the subsequent political transition. However, months of closed-door deliberations involving political and military figures failed to foster internal cohesion. Instead, TPLF leaders began exchanging sharp public accusations.
The resulting split has broadly coalesced into two camps: one aligned with Getachew Reda, seen as closer to the federal government; and another aligned with Debretsion Gebremichael. The latter, officially banned in Ethiopia, is widely viewed as more open to engagement with Asmara. Not surprisingly, there is little objection in Asmara to working with the TPLF, provided it remains a junior partner whose survival depends on Eritrea.
In practical terms, the TPLF’s political positioning continues to depend heavily on the posture of senior commanders and the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF). In this regard, the TDF has publicly graduated a new training cohort. At the ceremony, Tadesse Werede, head of the Tigray Interim Administration, emphasised that the build-up was intended to secure peace rather than prepare for renewed conflict, suggesting that the TPLF does not wish to be drawn into the current standoff between Asmara and Addis.
The Amhara dimension
Despite Tadesse’s statements, it is alleged that both the TPLF and Eritrea are undermining the Ethiopian government by advising and empowering the Amhara Fano, whose attacks on the Ethiopian army have become increasingly effective and deadly. If these allegations are accurate, then the Eritrean proxy war against Ethiopia is already in full swing. This would also mean that Fano, whose primary stated objective was to protect the Amhara from atrocities committed by Abiy’s forces, has now broadened its focus to collaborating with other Ethiopian opposition groups—including former armed adversaries such as the OLF and TPLF—to topple the government in Addis. Many observers note that Fano also appear to be working to unite under a single umbrella.
The Afar Dimension: Who is winning hearts?
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has justified his claim to Red Sea access in part by arguing that most Afar reside in Ethiopia rather than Eritrea or Djibouti, and therefore have a right to maritime access. In line with this narrative, his government has extended support to Afar organisations opposed to Eritrea’s government, granting them offices and operational freedom in Semera, the capital of Ethiopia’s Afar Regional State.
Among these groups is the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO), which was based in Ethiopia during the EPRDF era and was a member of the Ethiopia-based Eritrean opposition alliance. Another group is the Eritrean Afar National Congress (EANC), which plans to launch an armed struggle.
These efforts by the Ethiopian government to rally Afar communities on both sides of the border against Eritrea have not yet produced the desired outcomes. Instead, recent developments suggest a growing sentiment among Ethiopian Afar in favour of closer alignment with Eritrea. A prevailing narrative within some Afar circles holds that it is preferable to belong to a smaller state of three to four million people than to be subsumed within Ethiopia’s population of over 120 million.
A notable example is Ibrahim Osman Aliyu—known as Haji Ibrahim—a respected figure from Barahle in Zone 2 and a relative of Ethiopia’s Defence Minister, Aisha. Haji Ibrahim, along with a contingent of Afar Special Forces, defected to Eritrea a few months ago following disputes with Ethiopia’s federal government. In an interview with an Afar media outlet, he cited the absence of freedoms promised under the federal system as a key reason for his defection. He also condemned the federal government’s abandonment of northern Afar (Zone 2) during the Tigray war and its continued neglect of the area after hostilities ended. Furthermore, he accused federal authorities of pressuring Afar leadership to cede territory to the Somali Regional State.
To date, an estimated 300 Afar Special Forces and other supporters have joined him. Haji Ibrahim, trained by Eritrea, is credited with leading forces that repelled repeated TPLF attempts to seize control of the strategic Addis Ababa–Djibouti corridor during the Tigray war. Notably, the Afar and Oromia regions are the only Ethiopian states whose Special Forces were not dissolved, and the Afar Special Forces remain the only regional unit equipped with a mechanised component, trained by Eritrean troops in 2020.
This capability reportedly drew the attention of the U.S. ambassador during a visit to Semera.
U.S. and Saudi engagement in the context of tensions
Well-informed sources within the Afar Regional State leadership and in Mekele report that U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ervin Massinga, has undertaken multiple visits in recent months, shuttling between Addis Ababa, Semera, and Mekele.
According to these sources, during one visit to Semera, Massinga asked Afar Regional State President Awol Arba whether, in the event of an Ethiopia–Eritrea war, he could rely on the Afar Special Forces to fight against Eritrea—highlighting concerns that these forces might remain loyal to their Eritrean trainers. President Awol responded that he trusted most of them to defend Ethiopia.
It is also reported that Massinga persuaded Seyoum Awel, the former Afar Regional President who fought alongside the TPLF during the Tigray war, to return to Semera and reconcile with the current administration.
In his discussions in Mekele with the TDF, TPLF, and the Interim Administration, the ambassador reportedly advised against conflict with the federal government, describing Prime Minister Abiy’s army as formidable. He further cautioned them against engagement with the Eritrean government.
Saudi Arabia has also shown interest in the Ethiopia–Eritrea dispute. A close partner of Eritrea and a counterweight to UAE ambitions in the region, Riyadh simultaneously maintains significant economic ties with Ethiopia. Over the past two decades, Saudi investors have committed 260 billion birr to 233 projects in Ethiopia, creating more than 75,000 jobs. In 2022/2023, Ethiopian exports to Saudi Arabia generated $325 million in revenue. Balancing these relationships, Saudi Arabia attempted to mediate between Asmara and Addis Ababa. However, the initiative collapsed when Eritrea refused to engage in direct talks with Ethiopia.
Obviously, Eritrea’s proxy strategy reduces Ethiopia’s incentive for direct war, as Addis would face multi-front internal conflicts and economic stress. Nevertheless, a bid by Prime Minister Abiy to rally domestic support through external war cannot be ruled out. Such a move carries severe strategic risk for Ethiopia and could destabilise the wider Horn of Africa. Abiy’s push for Red Sea access may lead his government down the same path that engulfed Mengistu. This would be particularly tragic because Meles’s Ethiopia—with double-digit economic growth during his rule—demonstrated that the country can thrive without its own ports.
As far as Meles was concerned, the matter was settled; there was no need for another war. He told Ethiopians, “Anyone who wants to continue fighting for Eritrea can do so,” echoing the Tigrinya saying, “This is the field and this is the horse—gallop!
